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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 27[illegible]

May [illegible], 19[illegible]

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EIGHTH NST NEGOTIATING ROUND (S)

The attached instructions provide guidance for the eighth round of the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) which began on May 5, 1987, in Geneva. They build on the proposals made during my meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland. (S)

Ronald Reagan

Attachments

1. Overall Instructions (S)
2. START Instructions (S)
3. INF Instructions (S)
4. Defense and Space Instructions (S)

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SUBJECT: INSTRUCTION FOR ROUND VIII OF US/SOVIET NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS (S)

REF: (A) STATE 01312[illegible]; (B) PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO US NEGOTIATORS FOR DECEMBER 2-5 MEETING WITH SOVIET COUNTERPARTS; (C) STATE 336325; (D) STATE 330[illegible]; (E) STATE 2916[illegible]; (F) STATE 077781

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCE FOR US DELEGATION FOR THE EIGHTH ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. GUIDANCE FROM PREVIOUS ROUNDS AND SPECIAL DECEMBER MEETING REMAIN IN EFFECT EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BELOW. SPECIFIC GUIDANCE FOR EACH OF THE THREE NEGOTIATING GROUPS IS BEING PROVIDED SEPAREL.

3. PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES FOR ROUND VIII INCLUDE:

-- TO CONTINUE TO [illegible] PROMPT AND FORTHRIGHT RESPONSE TO THE US PROPOSALS IN THE THREE NEGOTIATING GROUPS, INCLUDING OUR NEW PROPOSAL IN DEFENSE AND SPACE AND OUR PROPOSALS IN START AND INF.

-- TO INTENSIFY THE SCHEDULE OF NEGOTIATIONS AND SEEK PROMPT NEGOTIATION OF AND AGREEMENT TO AN INF TREATY BASED ON THE US INF DRAFT TREATY TABLED IN ROUND VII.

-- TO TABLE IN ROUND VIII A DRAFT START TREATY WHEN IT IS COMPLETED AND APPROVED, INTENSIFY THE SCHEDULE OF NEGOTIATIONS, AND SEEK PROMPT NEGOTIATION OF AND AGREEMENT TO A START TREATY BASED ON THE US DRAFT.

-- TO CONTINUE TO PRESS US POSITIONS IN START AND DEFENSE AND SPACE, AND TO COUNTER SOVIET EFFORTS TO HOLD START NEGOTIATIONS HOSTAGE TO PROGRESS IN DEFENSE AND SPACE, NOTING THAT ACHIEVING

AGREEMENT ON A TREATY PROVIDING FOR DEEP EQUITABLE AND EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, ALONG WITH AN INF AGREEMENT, SHOULD BE OUR HIGHEST ARMS CONTROL PRIORITY.

4. IN ELABORATING ON US PROPOSALS AND NEGOTIATING DRAFT TREATY TEXTS, DELEGATION SHOULD ENSURE THAT THE PROVISIONS FOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION, CONFORMING TO THE THREE PRINCIPLES AGREED AT REYKJAVIK, ARE ADDRESSED AND AGREED CONCURRENTLY WITH PROVISIONS ON REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS.

5. AS PER PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS, IF THE SOVIETS RAISE NON-NST ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, DELEGATION SHOULD RESPOND THAT THESE ISSUES SHOULD BE PURSUED IN APPROPRIATE FORA, NOT NST. IF SOVIETS SPECIFICALLY RAISE ISSUE OF TIMING AND VENUE OF ABM TREATY REVIEW, DELEGATION SHOULD RESPOND, AS IN PARA 20 OF REFTEL F, THAT THE TREATY REVIEW SHOULD OCCUR AND THAT THE US WILL DISCUSS THE TIME AND VENUE/FORUM IN DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. IF PRESSED, DELEGATION SHOULD STATE THAT WHILE THE EXACT DATE CAN BE WORKED OUT IN DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, THE US POSITION IS THAT THE REVIEW CAN OCCUR ANYTIME IN THE YEAR FOLLOWING THE DATE OF THE FIVE-YEAR ANNIVERSARY OF THE TREATY. IF SOVIETS RAISE THEIR MOSCOW PROPOSAL TO DEAL WITH ABM TREATY ISSUES, INCLUDING PERMITTED AND PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES, IN THE SCC AT THE DEFENSE MINISTERS' LEVEL, DELEGATION SHOULD RESPOND THAT WASHINGTON HAS THE SOVIET PROPOSAL UNDER REVIEW AND WILL RESPOND THROUGH APPROPRIATE CHANNELS.

6. THE DELEGATION SHOULD CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE THE NEED FOR COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, NOTING OBSTACLES PLACED IN THE PATH OF ACHIEVING ARMS REDUCTIONS BY SOVIET NON-COMPLIANCE. IF THE SOVIETS RAISE THE MATTER OF US EXCEEDING SALT LIMITS, DELEGATION SHOULD UNDERSCORE THAT US POLICY DECISIONS ON THE SALT I INTERIM AGREEMENT AND SALT II IN LARGE PART RESULTED FROM SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THESE AGREEMENTS. THE DELEGATION SHOULD STRESS THAT THESE AGREEMENTS ARE BEHIND US, BOTH AS A MATTER OF LEGAL OBLIGATION AND AS A MATTER OF POLICY COMMITMENT. THE US HAS ESTABLISHED A POLICY OF INTERIM RESTRAINT IN ITS STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS PROGRAMS AND CALLED UPON THE USSR TO EXERCISE COMPARABLE RESTRAINT IN ITS PROGRAMS. OUR FOCUS, HOWEVER, SHOULD BE ON PROGRESS IN NST TOWARD EARLY AGREEMENT ON RADICAL AND STABILIZING REDUCTIONS IN THE OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR FORCES OF BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. ||

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SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR START NEGOTIATING GROUP-ROUND VIII

REFERENCES: (A) STATE 5357, (B) STATE 118, (C) 86 STATE 330273, (D) 86 STATE 2021, (E) 86 STATE 13816, (F) 86 STATE 54773, (G) 86 STATE 1254, (H) 85 STATE 2812, (I) 85 STATE 162424, (J) 85 STATE 7684

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCE FOR THE U.S. NEGOTIATING GROUP ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS FOR ROUND VIII. EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BELOW, PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS REMAIN UNCHANGED.

3. OVERALL OBJECTIVE. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP'S OBJECTIVE REMAINS AN EQUITABLE, VERIFIABLE, AND STABILIZING AGREEMENT REDUCING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS BY 50 PERCENT. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP'S CHIEF OBJECTIVES FOR ROUND VIII ARE:

-- TO TABLE A DRAFT U.S. START TREATY WHEN IT IS COMPLETED AND APPROVED AND TO SEEK TO MAKE IT THE MAIN FOCUS OF THE WORK OF THE TWO SIDES IN THE START NEGOTIATIONS.

-- TO CONTINUE TO SEEK AGREEMENT ON THE MAJOR OUTSTANDING ISSUES NECESSARY FOR A START TREATY INCLUDING, IN PARTICULAR, NUMERICAL SUBLIMITS ON BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS.

-- TO INTENSIFY THE SCHEDULE OF NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO PROTECT OPTIONS TO CONCLUDE A START TREATY WITHIN THE NEXT YEAR.

4. JOINT WORKING DOCUMENT. THE U.S. DRAFT TREATY, NOT THE JOINT WORKING DOCUMENT (JWD), SHOULD BE THE PRINCIPAL FOCUS OF NEGOTIATIONS IN ROUND VIII. INSOFAR AS THE SOVIETS HAVE DESCRIBED THE JWD AS A "STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES," WE DO NOT WISH TO PURSUE SUCH A DRAFTING EXERCISE AND INSTEAD WISH TO PURSUE A TREATY ALONG THE LINES OF THE NEW U.S. PROPOSAL. IF THE SOVIETS SUGGEST CONTINUING WORK ON THE JWD, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD TELL THE SOVIETS THAT THE JWD HAS SERVED ITS PURPOSE BY HIGHLIGHTING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SIDES AND, SINCE THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S MEETING HAS ALREADY TAKEN PLACE IN MOSCOW, THE UNITED STATES SEES LITTLE FURTHER VALUE IN A JWD. PENDING WASHINGTON APPROVAL OF A DRAFT START TREATY, HOWEVER, AND IN PREPARATION FOR ITS TABLING, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP MAY, AS PRACTICALLY APPROPRIATE, CONTINUE WORK ON THE JWD AS A MEANS TO CLARIFY AND RESOLVE REMAINING SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. THE U.S. SIDE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT SEE COMPLETE AGREEMENT ON A JWD AS AN ESSENTIAL STEP TOWARD REACHING AGREEMENT ON A START TREATY. INSTEAD THE SIDES SHOULD TRANSITION DIRECTLY FROM THE JWD TO THE DRAFT TEXT AS SOON AS IT IS AVAILABLE AND USE THIS TEXT AS THE NEGOTIATING DOCUMENT FOR RESOLVING REMAINING SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES.

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5. SUBLIMITS AND RELATED ISSUES. THE U.S. NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD STRESS THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF SUBSTANTIVE SOVIET MOVEMENT ON BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEAD SUBLIMITS. THE GROUP SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT MEANINGFUL SUBLIMITS ARE ESSENTIAL AND THAT THE U.S. WILL NOT BE IN A POSITION TO DEMONSTRATE FLEXIBILITY ON RELATED START ISSUES AS LONG AS THE SOVIETS REMAIN UNWILLING TO ACCEPT THE SUBLIMITS ALONG THE LINES PROPOSED BY THE U.S. AND AS PREVIOUSLY TABLED BY THE SOVIET UNION. NEGOTIATOR SHOULD STATE THAT THE U.S. HAS MADE SPECIFIC SUBLIMIT PROPOSALS AND THAT IT IS UP TO THE SOVIET SIDE TO RESPOND. THE GROUP SHOULD CATEGORICALLY REJECT ANY SUGGESTIONS THAT THE U.S. AGREED AT REYKJAVIK TO DROP SUBLIMITS AND SHOULD ALSO REJECT ANY ATTEMPT TO WALK BACK THE BOMBER COUNTING RULE AGREED AT REYKJAVIK AND RECORDED IN THE JWD.

6. REDUCTION SCHEDULE. IN ORDER TO EASE SOVIET CONCERNS PERTAINING TO RESTRUCTURING OF SOVIET FORCES, NEGOTIATOR SHOULD STATE THAT THE U.S. PROPOSES A REDUCTION SCHEDULE OF SEVEN YEARS AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY INSTEAD OF REDUCTIONS BEING COMPLETED BY THE END OF 1991, AS PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED.

7. MOBILE ICBMS. THE U.S. POSITION ON MOBILE ICBMS (AS STATED IN REF B) REMAINS UNCHANGED.

8. VERIFICATION. THE NEGOTIATOR SHOULD STATE THAT VERIFICATION PROVISIONS REMAIN A CRITICAL ELEMENT OF THE U.S. START PROPOSAL.

9. THROW-WEIGHT REDUCTION. THE U.S. CONTINUES TO SEEK A 50 PERCENT REDUCTION OF SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT. THE NEGOTIATOR SHOULD STATE THAT THE U.S. PROPOSES THAT THERE BE A TREATY REQUIREMENT FOR A DIRECT 50 PERCENT REDUCTION IN SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT TO A LEVEL SPECIFIED IN THE MOU OF A START TREATY. IN ADDITION, THE START TREATY WOULD CONTAIN A COMMITMENT THAT NEITHER SIDE WOULD EXCEED THAT LEVEL DURING THE LIFE OF THE TREATY. IF TACTICALLY NECESSARY, THE NEGOTIATOR MAY INDICATE THAT THE U.S. PREFERS SUCH DIRECT LIMITS, BUT DOES NOT RULE OUT INDIRECT LIMITS IF THEY CAN REDUCE SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT BY 50 PERCENT AND MAINTAIN IT AT (OR BELOW) THAT LEVEL.

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<TO>TO USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 9189
<SUBJ>SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE INF NEGOTIATING GROUP,
- ROUND VIII
REFERENCES: (A) STATE 58520 (B) STATE 71756 (C) USNST GENEVA
- 3616 (D) USNST GENEVA 3639
<TEXT>S E C R E T STATE 121518

SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE INF NEGOTIATING GROUP,
- ROUND VIII
REFERENCES: (A) STATE 58520 (B) STATE 71756 (C) USNST GENEVA
- 3616 (D) USNST GENEVA 3639

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. GUIDANCE FOLLOWS FOR THE INF NEGOTIATING GROUP FOR ROUND VIII. PREVIOUS GUIDANCE ON INF REMAINS UNCHANGED EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BY THESE INSTRUCTIONS.

3. PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE FOR THIS ROUND IS TO SEEK SOVIET AGREEMENT TO BEGIN SUBSTANTIVE JOINT DRAFTING OF AN INF TREATY. THE U.S. TREATY TEXT REFS A AND B CONTAIN THE SUBSTANCE OF THE U.S. POSITION AND SHOULD BE USED AS THE U.S. PROPOSAL FOR DRAFTING. SOVIET TABLING OF DETAILED INF TREATY TEXT INCLUDING VERIFICATION SPECIFICS, OR THEIR READINESS TO ENGAGE ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE US DRAFT TEXT WILL BE EVIDENCE OF SOVIET SERIOUSNESS THIS ROUND.

4. IN ORDER TO HAVE ALL ELEMENTS OF THE VERIFICATION POSITION ON THE TABLE AS EARLY IN THE ROUND AS POSSIBLE, THE DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON DATA AND THE PROTOCOL ON DESTRUCTION, DISMANTLEMENT AND CONVERSION WILL BE PROVIDED SEPTEL WHEN APPROVED, AND SHOULD BE TABLED AT A TIME THE DELEGATION DEEMS APPROPRIATE. THE PROTOCOL ON INSPECTION WILL BE COMPLETED AND SENT TO DELEGATION FOR TABLING AS SOON AS AVAILABLE.

5. WHEN PRESS THE SOVIETS TO ACCEPT THE SUBSTANCE OF U.S. POSITION AS CONTAINED IN DRAFT TREATY TEXT, DELEGATION SHOULD INFORM THE SOVIETS THAT THEIR WILLINGNESS TO RETURN TO AREAS OF CONVERGENCE, FROM WHICH THEY PREVIOUSLY DEPARTED, WILL NOT RESULT IN U.S. CONCESSIONS.

6. IN MOSCOW, THE SOVIETS TABLED ONE POINT PROPOSAL SEPARATE SRINF NEGOTIATIONS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON GLOBAL EQUALITY AND THE ELIMINATION OF SUCH SYSTEMS AT LEAST IN EUROPE. THEY APPEAR TO HAVE ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE OF AN OBLIGATION CONTAINED IN AN INITIAL INF AGREEMENT TO NEGOTIATE SRINF LIMITATIONS. THEY HAVE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD INCLUDE SCUD-B'S AND SS-23S, WOULD COVER THE RANGE BAND BETWEEN 500 AND 1000 KM, AND WOULD BE ON A GLOBAL BASIS. WASHINGTON IS CURRENTLY EXAMINING THE SOVIET PROPOSAL. THE DELEGATION SHOULD CONFIRM THE ABOVE OUTLINE OF THE SOVIET OFFER AND SEEK FURTHER DETAILS ON THE SOVIET SRINF POSITION. THE DELEGATION SHOULD NOTE THAT THE PROPOSAL DOES NOT ADEQUATELY MEET THE CRITERION SET FORTH BY THE US WITH

REGARD TO THE US CONCERN THAT ADEQUATE CONSTRAINTS ON SRINF BE PART OF AN INITIAL [illegible]F AGREEMENT. FURTHERMORE, ON THE BASIS OF CURRENT INFO[illegible]ATION, IT IS UNC[illegible]R HOW THE PROPOSAL MEETS SOME OF OU[illegible] OTHER CRITERIA. IF PRESSED FOR ACCEPTANCE, THE DELE[illegible]TIO[illegible] SHOULD NOTE [illegible]AT WASHINGTON IS EXAMINING SRINF IN L[illegible]HT O[illegible] DEVELOPMENT[illegible] IN MOSCOW IN CONSULTATION WITH [illegible]S ALLI[illegible]S.

7. IN RESPONSE TO DEL[illegible]ION REQUESTS F[illegible]IDA[illegible]NCE IN REF C, DELEGATION IS AUTH[illegible]RIZ[illegible]D TO STATE THA[illegible] PROCEDURES FOR PERMITTED CONVERSION [illegible]ILL BE SPECIFIED [illegible] THE DD AND C PROTOCOL.

8. GUIDANCE ON TECHNICAL AND EDITORIAL POI[illegible]TS RAISED IN REF D IN DRAFT TREATY TE[illegible]L BE PROVIDED [illegible]EL.

SECRET

SUBJECT: Instructions for Defense and Space Negotiating Group for Round VIII

REFERENCES: (A) 86 State 013191; (B) 87 State 036410;
(C) 86 State 082514; (D) 85 State 312028

1. SECRET - Entire text.

2. The following is guidance for the Defense and Space Negotiating Group to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms for Round VIII, beginning May 5, 1987. Except as modified below, guidance for Defense and Space Negotiating Group for the previous rounds remain in effect.

3. Overall Objectives and Approach: The principal U.S. goal in the Defense and Space area remains the preservation of the option to deploy, if we choose to do so, advanced strategic defenses which meet our criteria in a safe and stabilizing manner as soon as possible, preferably in a cooperative transition to greater reliance on defenses. The negotiating group should continue to review with the Soviets the basic elements of the U.S. approach to defense and space issues, with the purposes of realizing U.S. objectives and denying any conflicting Soviet goals. Primary U.S. objectives for the Defense and Space Negotiating Group in Round VIII are:

-- To present formally the new U.S. proposal in Defense and Space as presented by Secretary Shultz in his meeting in Moscow April 13-16 and outlined in paragraphs five through seven below. Negotiating Group should emphasize as appropriate, that this new proposal represents a continued U.S. effort to respond to Soviet concerns and to identify practical near-term steps to achieving agreements compatible with our longer-term goals. Negotiating Group should note that previous U.S. package proposals remain on the table but that the Soviets have rejected them.

-- To continue to focus the negotiations on the highest U.S. priorities: To facilitate deployment of effective strategic defenses as soon as possible should a decision for such deployment to taken; to achieve broad, deep, equitable and effectively verifiable reductions in strategic offensive arms; to avoid constraints beyond those existing under the ABM Treaty, to stop and to reverse Soviet erosion of the ABM Treaty regime; to discuss how to improve stability through a possible jointly managed transition to greater reliance on strategic defenses in combination with reductions in offensive ballistic missiles.

-- While maintaining the principal focus of the negotiations on the U.S. proposals and U.S. agenda, to respond to Soviet proposals, as they related to the work of the Defense and Space

Negotiating Group and its interrelationships with other areas, by continuing to criticize, question and probe them in accordance with the guidance below and previous instructions, by pointing to ways in which the U.S. proposals respond to Soviet concerns, and by encouraging the Soviets to simplify their approach and to accept instead an approach that would only entail limitations under the conditions the U.S. has proposed, on deployment rather than additional limitations on research, development and testing.

4. The new U.S. proposal, not a JWP, should be the principal focus of the Defense and Space Negotiations in Round VIII. Insofar as the Soviets have described the JWP as a "Statement of Principles," we do not wish to pursue such a drifting exercise and instead wish to pursue a treaty along the lines of the new U.S. proposal. If the Soviets suggest continuing work on the JWP, the Negotiating Group should tell the Soviets that the JWP has served its purpose by highlighting the differences between the sides and that since the Foreign Ministers' meeting had already taken place in Moscow, the United States sees little further value in a JWP. However, at the Negotiator's discretion, the Negotiating Group may engage in preparing a JWP, as a means of expressing progress toward a Treaty, reflecting the new U.S. proposal as outlined below.

5. New U.S. Proposal: In presenting the new proposal, Negotiating Group should point out that, because the Soviet Union rejected the U.S. proposal to eliminate offensive ballistic missiles by the end of 1996, the United States has formulated a new Defense and Space proposal. This new proposal is associated with our START proposal to accomplish 50-percent reductions in strategic offensive arms in seven years after the START Treaty enters into force. This new Defense and Space proposal incorporates the following provisions:

a. Non-Withdrawal. Both parties would commit through 1994 not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in order to deploy operational defensive systems whose unilateral deployment presently is not permitted under the ABM Treaty, provided certain other conditions are met (START reductions proceed to 50 percent as scheduled in accordance with the START Treaty).

b. Freedom to Deploy. After 1994, either side can deploy defensive systems of its choosing under the terms of this agreement and without further reference to the ABM Treaty, unless mutually agreed otherwise.

c. ABM Treaty Restrictions. If either side exercises its rights under the conditions of this new agreement to deploy defensive systems of its choosing, any remaining restrictions on both parties associated with the ABM Treaty will be considered terminated, unless mutually agreed otherwise.

d. Withdrawal/Termination. The U.S. rejects a blanket non-withdrawal commitment. Nothing above alters the sovereign rights of the sides under customary international law, including the right to withdraw were a side to decide that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. Each side must maintain its rights to terminate (in case of a material breach) or withdraw (in case a side decided its supreme interests were jeopardized).

e. Failure to Meet START Reductions. Any failure to meet the reductions schedule associated with the START Treaty would represent grounds for either side to terminate this agreement and all related commitments associated with the ABM Treaty.

f. Entry into Force. This agreement will be documented in the form of a treaty which will not enter into force before the associated treaty covering 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive forces enters into force.

6. In presenting this proposal, the Negotiating Group should make clear that (1) such a commitment would not alter our ability to withdraw from the treaty in response to a material breach or because of supreme national interest, and (2) we will continue to insist that the Soviets address their violation of the ABM Treaty.

7. In addition, to meet stated Soviet concerns with being able to predict the course of future research, the Defense and Space Negotiating Group should propose a "predictability package." In addition to our previous Open Laboratories proposal and our proposal for Reciprocal Observation of Testing, this package might include a formal annual exchange of programmatic data. It is intended that such a predictability package not entail any additional restrictions on United States programs beyond those indicated above. FYI: Negotiating Group should emphasize the Open Laboratories Initiative pending receipt of interagency papers on the other two portions of the predictability package. End FYI.

8. If the Soviets propose the sides develop a "Statement of Principles" for the START and Defense and Space fora, the Defense and Space Negotiating Group should respond that the U.S. is not interested in pursuing a "Statement of Principles" or framework agreement. Rather, the sides should work toward treaties in their respective working groups.

9. NST Relationship with Other Fora: The relationship between the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) and the NST Defense and Space Negotiating Group with the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) is defined in Instructions for SCC XXIX (Reftel D).

10. If the Soviets propose that the sides agree on a specific list of systems and devices banned from launching into space under the ABM Treaty, the Negotiating Group should say that

such an approach is not necessary because the ABM Treaty specifies the sides' obligations in this regard.